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The paper argues that internal sub-state dynamics can systematically account for the variety of 
forms in which politicians organize cross-jurisdictional interaction in dual federal systems. Most 
generally, majoritarian executive-legislative relations tend to weaken the institutionalization of 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), while power-sharing executive-legislative relations tend to 
facilitate it. Moreover, depending on the type of power-sharing mechanisms in the single arenas - 
non-compulsory or compulsory- the mutual integration of IGOs is rendered more or less difficult.  
 
The institutionalization of IGOs is affected by the following mechanisms: Firstly, given one-party 
majority cabinets, complete government alternations (which are much less likely given coalition or 
oversized governments) strongly alter actors’ interest constellations over time, thereby increasing 
the costs of maintaining stable cross-boundary intergovernmental relations. Secondly, the heavy 
impact of a potential electoral loss induces politicians to shift the blame to the other governments in 
the system, thereby undermining the potential for cross-boundary cooperation. Thirdly, one-party 
governments (in contrast to coalitions) decrease the value of IGOs as instruments to save 
transaction costs because the number of involved actors is lower. Finally, autonomy losses caused 
by intergovernmental cooperation are higher for parties which govern alone.  
Integration also suffers from these dynamic because strong IGOs often facilitate system 
integration. More importantly, however, it is weakened by compulsory power-sharing structures un-
bridged by party ties inside the sub-states because these internal divides considerably complicate 
coordination within the horizontal level.  
 
To examine these theoretically derived hypotheses, Canada, the U.S. and Switzerland are selected 
as ‘most different cases’. As a major result, in Switzerland internal dynamics support that IGOs are 
strongly institutionalized and intra-organizational linkages formally specified. In Canada internal 
dynamics are much less favorable: the organizational structure of the respective bodies and their 
mutual integration is much weaker. The U.S. takes a middle position. While intergovernmental 
arrangements are considerably institutionalized, the compulsory power-sharing structures within the 
states undermine mutual integration.  
 
  1Introduction and Research Question 
In the last decades, policy-interdependencies in federal systems have become more and more 
pronounced. They increasingly blur formally separate jurisdictions and create incentives for 
interaction across different spheres of authority. Europeanisation and globalization have been 
identified as major ‘external’ forces which motivate political actors to establish denser cooperation 
structures. Expanding state responsibilities, in contrast, are one major ‘internal’ force which 
intensifies boundary-crossing policy-interdependencies (Simeon 2001: 145-47; see also Börzel 2000; 
2001; 2002; Hooghe 1996; Hooghe/Marks 2001; Kincaid 2003; Peters/Pierre 2000; 2001). Facing 
these general developments, the strengthening of intergovernmental channels in federal systems, a 
trend towards cooperative federalism, can be plausibly hypothesized. Looking at the rich literature on 
intergovernmental relations (IGR), one finds clear indications of growing activities of central and sub-
state governments engaging in voluntary information exchange and policy-coordination across 
jurisdictional boundaries (i.e. Browne/Lazar 2003; Hrbek 2004; Lazar/Telford/Watts 2003).  
This important finding can be specified through theoretically guided cross-country 
analysis. Compared across countries, the rich variety of institutional embeddings of intergovernmental 
exchanges within distinct types of polities is astonishing. For instance, in some countries cross-
boundary exchanges are channeled directly by the respective ministries. In others, external bodies are 
established for this purpose. Organizational embeddings differ on two dimensions: first, regarding the 
institutionalization of the single intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); and second, regarding the 
integration of the system IGR, hence, the types of linkages between intergovernmental bodies within 
one federal system. Throughout the paper the concept of ‘institutionalization’ will therefore be used 
with reference to single intergovernmental bodies as entity of analysis. Integration, in contrast, will 
used with reference to the ‘system’ defined by the existing inter-organizational linkages. To give one 
empirical example:  
 
Confronted with the existing variety of structures, this paper proposes a theoretically developed 
account of the degree of institutionalization of single IGOs and their integration in Swiss, Canadian 
and U.S. federalism. It does so by referring to the dynamics within and across the respective sub-
states. Based on the general idea that internal sub-state dynamics spill over to the states’ external 
relations, systematic hypotheses about the implications of internal processes for the organizational 
character of intergovernmental channels are developed.  
 
The sub-states and the federal state are the core arenas in a federal state. They are defined as 
interaction contexts which are institutionally delimited and to which specific tasks and competencies 
are assigned. Quite evidently, the linkages between internal processes and external interaction - the 
linchpins between these arenas - are the positions that politicians occupy in them respectively (Benz 
2003; 2004). The federal and sub-state units define and delimit the respective political actors’ home 
arenas where politicians have to succeed in elections in order to take over government. Simply 
  2speaking, if intergovernmental interaction reduces politicians’ chances to pursue internal goals, this 
should reflect in a weaker institutionalization and integration of IGR. Hence, it is not only important 
to consider the ‘actorness’ of sub-state governments (Hocking 1999) but to identify the forces which 
drive these actors’ choices.  
Note that it is not argued that politicians apply the same ‘rules of appropriateness’ (Olsen 
1996: 89-92) internalized at home also in their external relations. Institutions constrain and regularize 
behavior and are set-up only if they facilitate actors to pursue their respective goals (Scharpf 1997; 
Scott 1995). Internal institutions and the resulting processes open windows of opportunity or sanction 
behavior (Héritier 1996; Farrell/Héritier 2004). Correspondingly, it is argued that strong IGOs are 
only established and maintained if the involved actors gain from it. In concrete, high competitive 
pressure and power-concentration in single government units undermines the institutionalization of 
IGOs. Low competitive pressure and internal power-sharing facilitate it. As an example, high electoral 
pressure in the inside easily motivates the actors to pursue a strategy of blame-shifting. Evidently, 
accusing other governments to improve own electoral fortunes easily undermines intergovernmental 
interaction.
1 In a more general way: actors have a weak tendency to engage in cross-boundary 
exchanges when they are more interested in struggling over internal distributional outcomes than in 
lowering external transaction costs through the institutionalization of IGOs.  
The integration of IGR is also weakened by strong competitive pressure. Furthermore, it is 
harmed by the internal constitutional fragmentation of the government units. While power-sharing in 
the sub-states generally strengthens the institutionalization of single IGOs, it is argued that integration 
also depends on the type of power-sharing structure prevalent in the constitutive states. The micro-
foundation of this rationalist approach - the single mechanisms assumed to steer actor behavior 
towards or against institutionalization and integration of IGR - will be laid out in detail in the 
following section.
2  
 
IGR which are defined as transactional activities and interactions between government units (Agranoff 
2004: 29) are voluntary. Accordingly, intergovernmental structures are of particular interest in those 
areas in which each sub-state possesses considerable law-making authority, hence can withdraw from 
interaction and resort to unilateralism whenever it considers such a path as profitable. The presence of 
exit options is most likely in dual federal systems. In this regard Canada, the U.S. and Switzerland are 
crucial cases. These dual federal systems are characterized by a comparatively clear-cut distribution of 
competencies and considerable administrative and fiscal capacities of all constitutive governments. 
They contrast with systems characterized by ‘cooperative federalism’ such as Germany or Austria 
                                                 
1 The party system’s degree of centralisation and the disharmony between the levels of government that it can generate – do 
not suffice to explain strong or weak IGR as Riker’s seminal work on federalism suggests (1964: 129-30): Multi-party 
systems can lead either to minimal-winning coalitions or to oversized coalitions. While minimal-winning coalitions still allow 
for cross-boundary competition, oversized coalitions most likely prevent it - independently of how strongly the party system is 
centralised. Accordingly, the congruence between governments will serve as only one indicator among several. 
2 The arguments focus on political actors who are directly subject to ‘political pressure’. How far the hypotheses apply to 
bureaucrats and how far they are subject to the same pressures will not be assessed in this paper.  
  3(Braun 2000; Wachendorfer-Schmidt 2000). The organizational character of IGR will be examined in 
dual federal systems because in these contexts one can trace back the different forms of 
intergovernmental interaction to internal sub-state dynamics while controlling as far as possible for 
fiscal and constitutional incentives. 
To clarify another fundamental concept beforehand, I understand intergovernmental 
institutions or organizations as independent bodies which channel exchanges between politicians 
belonging to different jurisdictions. Although many scholars use a very broad understanding of 
institution as a set of rules (North 1992; Knight 1990), direct inter-ministerial exchanges are 
understood as an expression of weakly institutionalized IGR if no autonomous institution that 
channels these exchanges exist.
3  
 
I. Party Competition, Power-Concentration and the Institutionalization of IGOs 
Majoritarian decision-making in the sub-states of a federal polity weakens the degree with which 
IGOs are institutionalized.
4 Internal power-sharing structures set the opposite incentives. This 
reasoning draws on Lehmbruch’s work on German federalism. In Germany, the tight coupling of 
arenas in which majoritarian processes interact with an interlocking system of horizontal and vertical 
cooperation causes considerable tensions. Partisan competition has an immediate impact on the 
politicians’ capacity to strike bargains in the federal arena (Lehmbruch 1978). For dual federalism, 
one can turn the argument around and develop the following line of reasoning: if federal systems do 
not provide already strong constitutional predispositions to develop dense IGR, it should follow that 
majoritarian processes within single arenas set incentives against the establishment of a full-fledged 
system of IGR.  
 
H1a: Given predominantly majoritarian decision-making dynamics in the sub-states and the centre the 
degree of institutionalization of IGOs will be weak. 
 
H1b: Given predominantly multiple power-sharing in most of the sub-states and in the centre the 
degree of institutionalization of IGOs will be strong. 
 
                                                 
3 Institutions are distinct from organization with reference to their functions and their members. They are directed towards the 
formulation or implementation of collectively binding rules and involve public personal - politicians or administrators. 
Although organizations can be involved in these tasks like in private-public partnerships, these structures presuppose the prior 
delegation of public responsibilities to private actors. 
4 Examining single intergovernmental arrangements, two aspects define the scope of these institutions: first, the number of 
participants taking part in intergovernmental arrangements, and second, the location of the respective participants (McRoberts 
1985; Simeon 1972). Accordingly, it is crucial whether the respective channels are inclusive or not and whether they are 
located on the ‘horizontal’ level only or, alternatively, on the ‘vertical’ level (hence link the sub-state level with the federal 
level). Inclusiveness will be considered as high if half or more of the sub-states participate, while inclusiveness is low if the 
respective number is below. To keep the terminology simple, structures of high inclusiveness are denoted as ‘multilateral’, 
while those of low inclusiveness are called ‘restricted’. Hence, we end up with four categories: horizontal-multilateral, 
vertical-multilateral, horizontal-restricted, vertical-restricted. Another crucial distinction is the one between IGOs which 
coordinate the sub-states on a general level and those which do so in particular policy fields. I refer to them as generalist and 
as sectoral. 
 
  4But how exactly are the ‘systemic’ tensions between majoritarianism within the single governmental 
units (Lijphart 1999) and strong intergovernmentalism between them rooted in the behavior of the 
actors? Which causal mechanisms are at work?  
(1) The first mechanism refers to the (in)stability of the interest configuration among the 
constitutive arenas. Given mostly 1-party majority cabinets in the constitutive states, government turn-
over strongly alters the interest configurations among the states. This raises the costs for actors to 
maintain strong IGOs. Ad hoc coordination, in contrast, allows politicians to adapt to these changing 
configurations. They participate in a profitable agreement when interest convergence is given with a 
certain group of partners. If this is not the case, they resort to unilateralism. A strongly 
institutionalized arrangement would delimit this flexibility. As soon as coalitions come into play, 
alternation is much weaker as a potential force of change because complete turnovers become less 
likely. Given mostly oversized coalitions, the interest configuration should be quite stable over time. 
Under these circumstances, ad hoc coordination has hardly advantages and this should reflect in the 
IGOs established in the system.  
A second aspect that characterizes the interest configuration among sub-state governments is 
its ideological congruence (Downs 1998; Thorlakson 2004). If party systems are similar across the 
constitutive governments, congruence is most likely when oversized governments are formed. Then, 
many parties are likely to participate in coalitions within different sub-states and therefore sub-state 
coalitions are likely to overlap ideologically. In federal systems with mainly 1-party governments, the 
likelihood increases for ideologically non-overlapping governments to be in office. 
(2) Given a high likelihood of alternation the immediate threat of electoral loss motivates 
regional politicians to shift blame to the other governments. The competitive pressure is strongest in 
two-party systems which constitute a ‘zero-sum-game’. Therein, mutual distrust is fostered because 
each actor knows of the other’s pressure to focus on the short-term goal of electoral victory at the cost 
of the long-term goal of fruitful intergovernmental exchanges. In such a two-level game (Putnam 
1988) the intergovernmental game is clearly subordinated (Cameron/Simeon 2002). The threat of 
government alternation and the resulting tendency to shift blame is comparatively weaker if coalitions 
need to be formed. Then, vote losses do not necessarily mean that a party cannot achieve coalition 
participation.
5  
(3) The number of parties in the constitutive governments has an impact on the transaction 
costs that can be saved by IGOs (Opeskin 2001: 133; Scharpf 1997: 70).
6 1-party executives make ad 
hoc coordination profitable because transaction costs are comparatively low. Within multi-party 
governments a higher number of actors with genuine preferences is involved. Then, intergovernmental 
arrangements which lower transaction costs are much more valuable.  
                                                 
5 Based on this rationale, one can also conclude that the less visible and the less relevant policies are in the electoral arena the 
denser cooperation in these policy fields will be. This is because the described counter-incentives linked to high electoral 
saliency are less pronounced. However, for the sake of parsimony differences across policy fields cannot be examined in this 
paper. 
6 The complexity of the horizontal configuration is also affected by the number of sub-states.  
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(4) When engaging in intergovernmental interaction, autonomy losses are bigger for parties 
which govern alone than for parties which govern in a coalition. If power-sharing is a part of daily 
decision-making in one’s home arena the relative autonomy losses are comparatively minor.  
 
All the mechanisms summed up in Table 1 affect the costs and benefits related to the establishment 
and the maintenance of institutionalized IGOs. They reduce or increase the willingness to carry the 
costs of institutionalization. Based on these structurally generated dispositions one can draw 
assumptions about the expected degree of institutionalization of IGOs in a federal system. 
 
Table 1: The Impact of Cabinet Type on the Willingness of Political Actors to Set up Strong 
Intergovernmental Institutions  
 
Dominant 
Cabinet Type 
in Constitutive 
Arenas 
 
 
 
One-Party 
Majority 
Cabinets 
 
 
One-Party 
Minority 
Cabinet 
 
 
Minimal 
Winning 
Coalition 
 
 
Minority 
Coalitions 
 
 
Oversized 
Coalitions 
 
Stability of 
Interest 
Configuration 
 
- low stability 
of interest 
configuration 
 
 
- low stability 
of interest 
configuration 
 
 
- medium 
stability of 
interest 
configuration 
 
 
- medium 
stability of 
interest 
configuration 
 
 
- high stability of 
interest 
configuration 
Transaction 
Cost Savings  
- low  - low  - medium  - medium  - high 
 
 Blame-
Avoidance 
  
 
- high 
incentives for 
blame-shifting 
 
 
- high 
incentives for 
blame-shifting 
 
- medium 
incentives for 
blame-shifting 
 
- medium 
incentives for 
blame-shifting 
 
- low incentives 
for blame-
shifting 
 
 
Autonomy 
Loss 
 
 
- high 
autonomy loss 
 
- high 
autonomy loss 
 
- medium 
autonomy loss 
 
- low autonomy 
loss 
 
- low autonomy 
loss 
 
 
⇒ Overall 
Willingness to 
Set-Up strong 
IG 
Institutions  
 
 
 
 
⇒ Low 
 
 
 
⇒ Low 
 
 
 
⇒ Medium 
 
 
 
⇒ Medium 
 
 
 
⇒ High 
 
 
II. Majoritarianism, Types of Power-sharing, and the Integration of IGR 
In this section I do not focus on single IGOs, but, rather, on the system of IGR and with it the linkages 
between different types of bodies. The distinction is important because the two do not always go 
together. A strong integration of the intergovernmental system is likely to presuppose at least a medium degree of institutionalization of the organizations. However, a strong institutionalization of 
IGOs does not necessarily lead to strong integration; under certain conditions it might even conflict 
with it. Hence, it needs to be hypothesized under which conditions different intergovernmental bodies 
are mutually supportive and under which they tend to conflict with each other. The degree of 
integration of an IGR system is indicated by the types of linkages between the core IGOs.
7 
The dynamics inside the sub-states in particular affect the vertical integration of a system. 
With power-concentrating executives in the inside and high autonomy losses through 
intergovernmental interaction, bodies responsible for sub-state exchanges are likely to be directed 
towards autonomy protection and, with it, against central encroachment. In the same way, the 
tendency towards blame-shifting to the centre should weaken integrative efforts. 
 
H2: Given majoritarian decision-making dynamics in the constitutive arenas of a federal system a 
strong vertical integration is unlikely. 
 
In the reverse, hypothesis 2 implies that if there is power-sharing in the constitutive government units, 
inter-organizational linkages should be strong. However, this is only the case if non-compulsory 
power-sharing is predominant. To analyze incentives against or in favor of integration, the distinction 
between compulsory  and  non-compulsory power-sharing structures is crucial. Power-sharing 
structures denote decision-making arenas in which the agreement of each participant is necessary to 
make a decision. Yet it is crucial that not all power-sharing structures affect actor behavior in the same 
way (Birchfield/Crepaz 1998; Czada 2004; Kaiser 1997).  
Compulsory power-sharing structures (e.g. bicameralism, presidentialism) are constitutionally 
entrenched and can be considered as exogenous to the strategic choices of the actors which are 
embedded in them. In contrast, non-compulsory power-sharing structures (e.g. coalition governments, 
corporatism) are deliberatively established by the actors. They are endogenous. Hence, they can only 
be maintained when they are sufficiently effective. For instance, if a coalition partner blocks intra-
coalitional decisions too frequently he brings down the coalition. By doing so, he risks losing its veto 
position. Consequently, actors in non-compulsory structures are assumed to make a more restrictive 
use of their vetoes than actors in compulsory structures in order to stabilize the decision-making 
structure. Actors in compulsory structures share power only because it is constitutionally imposed on 
them. Since externally imposed power-sharing is more difficult to overcome than self-established 
structures are maintained, compulsory power-sharing in the constitutive arenas of a federal state 
considerably complicates the aggregation of single state positions. In such a context, the capacity of 
the constitutive governments to link IGOs is easily undermined. This is the case even if competitive 
pressure within the arenas is low. 
 
                                                 
7 If there is only one horizontal-multilateral IGO in place that is highly institutionalized, also horizontal integration is 
necessarily high. 
  7H3: Given dominant constitutional power-sharing structures in the constitutive government units, 
strong integration is unlikely.  
 
III. The Empirical Analysis of Intergovernmental Relation 
III. How to Operationalize the Degree of Institutionalization – The Boundedness and Internal 
Differentiation of IGOs 
As already mentioned, intergovernmental interaction denotes a negotiated, non-hierarchic exchange 
not only between institutions on different governmental levels but also between the actors of different 
sub-states (Peters/Pierre 2001: 131; Agranoff 2004).
8 It can be realized in the coordination of policy-
making or in co-decision. Coordination captures mutual adjustment of policies on an ad-hoc basis 
while co-decision denotes regular decision-making (Cameron 2001: 125; Elazar 1991: 76; Scharpf 
1997). Each form of interaction tends to go hand in hand with a different organizational embedding of 
the respective interaction patterns.  
These embeddings need to be empirically specified: Voluntary mutual adjustment, hence 
‘ad hoc coordination’, does not necessitate the regularity of meetings, a bureaucratically supported 
and internally differentiated body, a formal decision-making rule, the legally binding status of 
agreements (Opeskin 2001: 130; Arnold/Plant 1994; Cameron 2001; Simmons 2002). To the contrary, 
these are empirical features of a highly institutionalized embedding which should facilitate co-
decision. Ad hoc coordination tends to lack these features and allows for maximal flexibility and the 
autonomy of the participating parties. It does so for the price of decreased reliability by which strong 
institutionalization is usually accompanied.  
 
Empirically, the institutionalization of IGOs becomes visible in a process of internal organizational 
development. This development is directed towards a more complex functional distribution of tasks to 
different offices or even sub-units. Moreover, it shows in a process of external differentiation 
(boundedness): the institution develops boundaries towards other institutions in terms of own 
functions as well as material resources (Judge 2003: 500-1). The ‘strength’ or ‘weakness’ of the 
institutionalization of IGR is indicated by a set of features which express these two aspects 
empirically as summed up in the following table.
9 The listed indicators are assumed to be mutually 
related and their order signifies the increasing degree of institutionalization that is supposed to be 
linked to their presence. Hence, the elements are assumed to cluster, without one element being a 
necessary condition for the other. 
 
 
                                                 
8 This definition also includes administrative actors. Yet due to the relative independence of bureaucrats from democratic 
competition in general, the mode according to which technocrats cooperate should be less affected by the internal organization 
of the arenas. In this first assessment, the focus rests on political and partisan actors. 
9 It is important to note that neither all of the elements need to be present in order to speak of a highly institutionalized system 
in which regular co-decision is practiced. Nor does ad hoc coordination imply the complete absence of them. 
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Table 2: Indicators for the Degrees of Institutionalization of IGOs 
Density of contacts 
Regularity of meetings 
⇒ Weak 
⇒ Institutionalization 
Autonomous organization 
- Own Secretariat  
- Clearly defined functions 
- Formal basis (e.g. formal statutes) 
⇒ Medium 
⇒ Institutionalization 
Majority Rule  
Internal functional differentiation 
- specification of offices 
- specification of sub-units/bodies 
Legal status of agreements 
Specificity of agreements 
 
 
⇒ Strong 
⇒ Institutionalization 
 
Even if the density of exchanges is quite high at times or regular meetings are set up between the 
prime ministers and the ministers responsible for particular sectors, institutionalization is considered 
as weak if it is organized directly by the governmental departments without a separate 
intergovernmental body in place. A medium institutionalization demands the ‘boundedness’ of an 
arrangement. This does not mean that boundaries are de facto closed. Neither is exit extremely costly 
nor entry extremely difficult. Instead, ‘boundedness’ is visible through the assignment of specific 
competencies, resources and personal. It indicates that intergovernmental transactions do not 
exclusively express a momentary interest convergence of a group of individual actors anymore. The 
higher the degree of institutionalization is the more likely an organization is capable to affect the 
behavior of the involved actors independently of their isolated interests.  
Accordingly, the most crucial sign of strong institutionalization is a formal decision-making 
rule which deviates from unanimity. The capacity to bind the sub-states to positions or agreements 
they did not agree to most strikingly indicates that the IGO represents more than the sum of its parts. 
Another feature is the internal differentiation into offices or organs that have own formally assigned 
tasks. Moreover, a strong degree of formalization and specification is also likely to affect the kind of 
agreements struck within the IGO. With increasing formalization and differentiation, the capacity of 
the body increases to produce proposals of high specificity.
10 And the higher their specificity, the 
more useful is a legal foundation to increase the likelihood of their transfer in sub-state legislation.
11 
Hence, the specificity and the legal status of the agreements provide additional indicators (Poirier 
2002: 430-34; Simeon 2001: 148; Simmons 2002). Based on this list, if more than half of the criteria 
are fulfilled, an IGO is classified as strongly institutionalized. 
                                                 
10 Specificity can be measured according to the following four categories denoting low to high specification of agreements: 1) 
very general, abstract goals only (economic prosperity; equal treatment of citizens across federation) without direct 
implication for legislative action of the participating governments, 2) general goals specifying the direction of certain 
measures (balanced budget implying a reduction of government spending yet without specifying the area), 3) provisions 
indicating measures in particular policy fields (cutting health care spending) and 4) provisions defining concrete measures (see 
Poirier 2002).  
11 Note that no conclusions are drawn to outcomes in terms of the likelihood and effectiveness of agreements’ final 
implementation, since this dimension leaves the (even widely defined) ‘political sphere’. It would demand a detailed analysis 
of administrative processes. And these again are difficult to link back to the major hypotheses on the effects of political 
dynamics in the sub-states on intergovernmental relations.   10
 
III.2 Specifying the System – How to Measure the Degree of Integration  
I now move over to the empirical assessment of the ‘linkages’ between IGOs. Just to mention two 
crucial indications for weak system integration: first, the vertical channel is only weakly developed. 
And second, several institutions located on the horizontal level compete as channels for 
intergovernmental exchange because their respective responsibilities are not clarified. If, instead, one 
body monopolizes this function, fragmentation on the horizontal level is rather low and feeds back to 
the integration of the system in a positive manner. This reasoning draws on arguments developed in 
research on party organization and its impact to federal decentralization. Analyzing the integration of 
a federal system, one can distinguish between ‘confederal’ and ‘integrated’ parties. The distinction 
refers to the weak or strong organizational and programmatic linkages between federal and regional 
party organizations (Smiley 1987; Grande 2001).  
Accordingly, one can capture the degrees of inter-organizatioanl linkages through the 
following indicators: A weak integration presupposes that contacts between the core IGOs can be 
identified. If IGOs meet regularly a medium integration is assumed. Integration is considered as strong 
when the relationship between different bodies and the respective responsibilities are specified by 
statutes. Such statutes stabilize their mutual cooperation and reduce conflicts since they clarify each 
body’s sphere of authority. Moreover, integration is strong when there are no IGOs with similar or 
equal scope directed towards channeling the same type of exchanges without task being clearly 
distributed.
12 
 
Table 3: Degrees of Integration between IGOs 
Contacts with other IGOs  ⇒ Weak Integration 
Regularised Meetings with other IGOs  ⇒ Medium Integration 
No Co-existence of IGOs with Similar Scope 
Formal Statutes about respective Responsibilities and Meetings 
⇒ Strong 
⇒ Integration 
 
IV. The Empirical Analysis of Sub-State Dynamics 
IV. 1 Case Selection 
As already pointed out, to identify the effects of internal sub-state dynamics on IGR, it is reasonable 
to look at dual federal systems in which both levels of government possess considerable fiscal and 
jurisdictional powers. Canada, Switzerland and the U.S. are chosen as cases because they widely 
correspond with this model with regard to their federal constitutions. The indicator used to assess 
the sub-states’ financial strength is the revenue share.
13 It is a crucial measure for the sub-states’ 
capacity to act independently in their own spheres of competence. In 1995, the revenue share in all 
three countries was higher than in any other OECD country: 46.72% in Switzerland, 41.65% in the 
                                                 
12 Type of exchanges refers to the distinction general vs. sectoral coordination.  
13 Calculated as the sum of revenues of the local and regional level as percentage of the total revenues (Braun 2000: 53). US and 52.21% in Canada. A similar picture emerges concerning the share of sub-national 
expenditure in total expenditures (Braun 2000: 39; 52-53).
14  
In addition to holding financial dependence constant, one needs to control for 
constitutional incentives that favor intergovernmental interaction. The more that powers are 
assigned to closed ‘watertight compartments’ the weaker the incentives for cross-boundary 
interaction. The more the constitution provides for wide areas of concurrent powers, the stronger 
they are (Simeon 2001: 148). Hence, it is useful to look at the areas of concurrent legislation which 
are supposed to foster cooperative behavior in federal systems. On the basis of Watt’s overview of 
the competence distribution in federal systems one gets to the following result: Switzerland ends up 
with 17.8% of concurrent legislation based on the range of policy areas classified, while Canada has 
only 2.5% and the US 13.6% (Watts 1999: 126-30). While the differing amounts of concurrent 
legislation supports stronger IGOs in Switzerland, they cannot account for the respective degrees of 
integration. Moreover, in comparison to Germany with 62% of concurrent legislation (Watts 1999: 
126-30) the three countries can be regarded as sufficiently similar to examine the impact of intra-
governmental dynamics on the embeddings of intergovernmental exchanges. 
 
IV.2 Measuring Sub-State Dynamics 
Before examining the hypotheses presented in Section I. empirically, the four explanatory features 
which result from sub-state dynamics need to be operationalized.  
In order to measure the internally generated ‘competitive pressure’ which affects the 
stability of the interest configuration and the tendency towards blame-shifting, the average 
alternation rate is used as first indicator. With regard to government turn-over, one can distinguish 
between partial and complete alternations. A partial alternation, in contrast to a complete one, is 
given when some government parties are replaced while others stay in office (Strøm 1990). 
Complete alternations are most likely given 1-party cabinets and become less likely the more 
fragmented the parliamentary party system is and the more parties participate in coalitions. 
Evidently, complete alternations generate more competitive pressure than partial ones. Since it is 
crucial to capture the pressure of elections I count only those governments that have been formed 
after an election without considering alternations during the term. The alternation rate will be 
assessed in relation to the maximal number of times an alternation could have occurred, that is, to 
the absolute number of elections. Regarding the presidential system of the U.S., I qualify as 
complete alternation a complete shift from one unified government configuration
15 dominated by 
                                                 
14 Moreover, the role of conditioned grants deserves attention since it can create considerable dependence on the centre. The 
share of grants (the sum of grants received by the local or regional level from the central government as percentage of the 
revenue of the local and regional level) is the following: Switzerland 46.72%, Canada 61.9%, USA 58.9% (Braun 2000: 52-
53).In the US and in Canada, the federal government uses this instrument very frequently to steer policy making in areas in 
which it has no jurisdictional powers but in which nation-wide harmonization is desirable (Braun 2000: 40). In Switzerland 
grants are much less important. However, this difference is unlikely to create a bias since the institutionalization of IGOs as 
well as their mutual integration are expected to be stronger in the Swiss than in the Canadian and the U.S. case.  
15 Unified government is defined as a configuration when the majorities of both chambers and the executive belongs to the 
same party. 
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Democrats to one unified configuration dominated by Republicans and vice versa.
16 Also in 
Switzerland executive and legislative elections are separate but in contrast to the U.S. divided 
government configurations are unusual
17, hence the legislative composition will not be taken into 
consideration. Besides the rate of complete alternations, I will also look at the number of partial 
alternations to get a more detailed picture.  
To capture the substantial make-up of the interest configuration, the average ideological 
congruence between the governments in office is specified. A measure of congruence does not 
primarily tell us how frequently actors have to adapt to changes such as the alternation rate. Instead, 
it qualifies the ideological complexity of the respective configurations. Congruence is assumed if 
parties in different governments belong to the same party family even if the party system is 
decentralized. All in all, the conflict potential between these parties should be lower than between 
completely different ones.
18  
To measure congruence, one has to assess to which degree the same type of parties have 
been in office across the different constitutive arenas at one point in time. As proposed in the 
literature, the congruence between the two levels of government is assessed by the average 
percentage of sub-state governments that deviate in their composition from the national government 
in office (Downs 1998: 138-39; Thorlakson 2004). What is crucial for this study, however, is the 
congruence on the horizontal level. It will be operationalized in two steps. The more different 
government configurations overlap in composition because ideologically close parties participate in 
different coalitions, the more moderate the governments are likely to behave towards each other. 
Accordingly, one proxy for the conflict potential is the percentages of non-overlapping 
governments. The lower this percentage is the lower the conflict potential, the higher it is the more 
likely intra-horizontal conflict becomes.
 19  
   In a second step the relative weight of non-overlapping governments will be 
assessed according to the Laasko-Taagepera-index (Laakso/Taagepera 1979).
20 The more even the 
distribution of the government configurations’ representation in the sub-states at a given point 
(indicated by 2,0 or 3,0…instead of 2,4 or 3,6), the more conflict potential exists because the 
ideological profiles are represented with about equal strength in the sub-state cabinets. The higher 
the figure (5 instead of 2), the more difficult agreement becomes. Taken together, an average of 5 in 
one country as compared to 3,5 in another country indicates that in the first country 5 equally 
                                                 
16 One might argue that this is more demanding than the measure for parliamentary systems since three different elections 
need to favour one party to lead to unified government. However, a similar problem occurs when comparing a two-party 
system with a multi-party system. 
17 See for a detailed analysis of cantonal executives Vatter (2002), Ch. 2. 
18 When using means one has to pay attention to the changes over time. If they are too considerable, it is necessary to look 
whether these changes affected intergovernmental relations in the expected way. 
19 The relative size of parties which participate in different sub-state coalitions also makes a difference. However, even if only 
a small coalition partners ‘links’ one sub-state with the other, a moderating effect can be expected.  
20The formula ist he following: The number N = 1/Σsi
2 in which si is the proportion of sub-states governed by the i-th 
government configuration. represented configurations have to find agreement compared to 4 non-equally distributed in the 
second. In the latter configuration the conflict potential is assumed to be lower.
21 
The measurement of transaction-costs savings generated by intergovernmental interaction 
is quite straightforward. One simply counts the average number of decision-makers, namely the 
number of government parties plus the number of constitutionally defined veto players such as 
second chambers.
22 The more decision-making units are involved, the higher the costs of free 
coordination and the higher the incentives to institutionalize IGOs. 
The relative autonomy loss of a sub-state when engaging in intergovernmental interaction 
can be measured by the average number of one-party cabinets with and without a majority in the 
constitutive governments.
23 With regard to the U.S., I consider the average number of united 
government configurations.  
 
IV.3 Sub-State Dynamics in Canada, the U.S. and Switzerland 
In this section the measures are used to assess the intra-regional dynamics in favor or against the 
institutionalizations of IGOs and their mutual integration in Canada, the U.S. and Switzerland. 
Table 4 sums up the results. The data used covers the governments formed after the regional 
elections taking place after 1980.
24 
 
Table 4: Measures of Sub-State Dynamics
25  
  Percentage 
of 1-Party  
Governments 
Percentage 
of Complete 
Alternations 
Percentage 
of Partial 
Alternations
 
Average 
Number of 
Decision-
makers 
Percentage 
of Non-
Overlapping 
Governments 
Average 
Effective 
Number of 
Non-
Overlapping 
Governments 
Canada  100% 28.7%
26 
 
0 1  100% 
 
2.735 
U.S.  43%
27 0  61.5%
28 3  43% 
 
1.651 
Switzerland  3% 0  29%  3,34  4%
29 
 
- 
                                                 
21 Note that the percentage of non-overlapping governments and the effective number of non-overlapping governments need to 
be considered together. Obviously, the more overlap, the less relevant is the relative weight of the non-overlapping 
governments. If the overlapping governments are over 80%, the effective number of non-overlapping governments is not very 
telling and need not be referred to. 
22 Since in the U.S. parties are very weak and the effect of divided government contested in research, I count the governor and 
the 2 chambers, hence 3 decision-makers per government unit. The ideological composition will find consideration in the 
congruence measure. 
23 Also a one-party minority cabinet is likely to dominate the legislative process. In particular when it is located it in the centre 
and has a bilateral opposition to assure legislative majority support should be fairly unproblematic (Green-Pedersen 2001; 
Tsebelis 2002). As a rule of thumb, one-party minority governments are assumed to generate similar effects like one party 
majority governments. The dynamics of minority coalitions should resemble majority coalition cabinets.  
24 The Swiss data covers only the period 1983-2000. 
25 Results based on Dyck (1986), and data set by Vatter/Freitag/Müller/Bühlmann (2005) and own data.  
26 Range 0% Alberta to 50% Québéc.  
27 Range 37%-49%.  
28 On average 8 partial alternations per state over 13 elections (range 7-9). Own calculations based on data of the National 
Council of State Legislatures. 
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As Table 4 indicates, Canada has the highest percentage of 1-party governments, the highest rate of 
complete alterations, the lowest average number of decision-makers and the lowest rate of overlapping 
governments. Starting with the dominant cabinet type, all sub-state governments since 1980 were 
formed by one party alone and most of them had a majority of seats. Autonomy losses generated by 
intergovernmental interaction are therefore high and weaken the provincial actors’ willingness to 
invest in IGOs. In addition, the number of complete alternations indicates a comparatively high 
competitive pressure within the provinces which favors blame-shifting and thereby undermines cross-
boundary exchanges. Moreover, the interest configuration is likely to change rapidly which makes 
flexible ad hoc coordination profitable. Since there is only one decision-maker per province
30, the 
transaction costs caused by ad hoc coordination are low and with it the incentive to invest in bodies 
which could lower these costs even further. This effect is further strengthened by the noticable 
ideological incongruence of the average horizontal interest configurations. There are no government 
coalitions, hence none of the ideological configurations have overlapped compared to an average of 
43% non-overlapping governments in the U.S. and an average of 4% in Switzerland. The effective 
number of non-overlapping governments of 2.735 on average points out that there has not been one 
dominant government type which could have unified the horizontal level ideologically. Instead, two to 
three configurations continuously have been competing for influence.  
All in all, intra-provincial and with it intra-horizontal dynamics in Canada render the 
institutionalization of IGOs and their mutual integration fairly difficult. 
 
The American case takes a middle position between Canadian and Swiss sub-state dynamics: Starting 
with the 3 constitutionally defined decision-makers per state, IGOs should be valuable instruments to 
save transaction costs. The effective number of non-overlapping governments (1.651) shows that one 
party has usually ruled in most of the sub-states. Hence, the horizontal conflict potential due to 
ideological incongruence has been fairly moderate. The percentage of non-overlapping governments is 
on average only 43% which means that in a majority of states each party occupies at least one branch 
of government and this also moderates inter-state relations. At the same time it also complicates intra-
state relations: the separation of branches as constitutional power-sharing structure characterizes the 
internal political process to a wider extent than party dynamics do because parties are comparatively 
weak (Katz 1994). And this dominance of constitutional structures has evident implications for the 
interpretation of the effective number of non-overlapping governments: although there has been an 
overweight of Republican or Democratic unified state governments over the years, this rather 
indicates a limited conflict potential than a unifying effect on the horizontal level. The alternation 
rates indicate a limited competitive pressure which favors the institutionalization of IGOs. There have 
                                                                                                                                                          
29 For the Swiss case the percentage of governments formed by parties which belong only to one ideological block (centre, left 
or right) is used as a proxy for the percentage of non-overlapping governments.  
30 The territories have improved their position within the federation over time. However, they are not independent from the 
central government, hence are in a weaker position than the provinces.  
  14been no complete alternations yet partial alternations have occurred after 61.5% of the elections. Due 
to the two-party system each time a partial alternation occurs at least one government branch with 
veto power changes its partisan make-up. Since parties are weaker than in Canada and Switzerland, 
the implications for the actual conflict potential may again not be overestimated. Nevertheless, 
frequent partial alternations increase the internal complexity, complicate the aggregation of one state 
interest and with it one intra-horizontal interest profile which disfavors integration.  
In sum, the rather low competitive pressure, the low autonomy losses and the rather high 
transaction costs involved in horizontal interaction make IGOs a useful tool to facilitate inter-state 
interaction. They should be considerably institutionalized. At the same time, the constitutional 
fragmentation within the states should weaken their mutual integration. 
 
In Switzerland, intra-cantonal dynamics set very favorable incentives for the institutionalization of 
IGOs and their mutual integration. The competitive pressure is very low since there have been no 
complete alternations. Moreover, only 3% of the cantonal executives have been 1-party governments 
and the number of non-overlapping governments is only 4%.
31 Incentives for blame-shifting strategies 
are hardly given. Due to the high number of oversized governments a party easily blames executives 
in which own ideological pendants participate. Furthermore, due to the oversized cabinet formats, the 
stability of the horizontal interest configuration over time is rather high. Since the cantonal party 
systems mainly differ in the weight of the single parties not in the composition of the party systems 
(Grande 2001; Ladner 2001) similar executive compositions across cantons moderate inter-cantonal 
relations. The number of partial alternations in Swiss cantons is with 29% quite high although still 
considerably lower than in the American states. However, one needs to consider that with an average 
4-5 effective parties
32 (Ladner 2001: 127; see also Vatter 2003) the Swiss party system is considerably 
more fragmented on the sub-state level than its Canadian and American pendants. For reasons of 
logic, partial alternations are much more likely. Even more importantly, Vatter’s analysis of changes 
in partisan compositions of cantonal executives between 1945 and 1995 confirms that most partial 
alternations are minor because they change less than half of the executives’ composition (2002: 69).
33 
Finally, the average number of decision-makers clearly supports strong IGOs. With 3.34 it is more 
than three time as high as in Canada and slightly higher than in the U.S.. Accordingly, transaction 
costs savings through the institutionalization of IGOs are rather extensive.   
 
In sum, the overall incentive profiles of the three federal countries with regard to IGR look the 
following: in Canada neither the institutionalization of single IGOs nor their mutual integration should 
be high, in the U.S. the institutionalization of single IGOs should be considerable. Their mutual 
                                                 
31 The percentage of non-overlapping governments is only 4%, the effective number of non-overlapping governments needs 
not be assessed since it cannot tell something substantial about the nature of the configuration.  
32 Effective number of parties computed according to the Laasko-Taagepera-index (1979). 
33 Only one time four executive mandates changed after one election. The same is true regarding changes of 3 mandates 
(Vatter 2002: 69). Executives are composed of 5-7 mandates. 
  15integration should however suffer from the internal constitutional fragmentation of the American 
states. In Switzerland, the internally generated incentives favor both: institutionalization as well as 
integration. 
 
IV.4 Multilateral IGOs in Canada, U.S. and Switzerland: Institutionalization and Integration 
After having examined the intra-regional incentive structures to set up and link IGOs in the three 
federal countries, this final section assesses the basic aspects of the respective multilateral-horizontal 
and multilateral-vertical IGOs. Due to the limited scope of the paper, this view is deliberately 
restricted in several respects. It only accounts for organizations which represent the states, hence, 
channel inter-state or federal-state exchanges.
34 Moreover, it leaves out regionally-based state 
associations which exist in all three federations.  
With regard to this restricted set of arrangements two questions will be addressed in the 
following: to what degree do the sub-states in a federal state form one level of government expressed 
through the organizational make-up of single horizontal IGOs and through the presence of particular 
inter-organizational linkages? Integration can be examined referring to three kinds of linkages: first, 
the linkages between different generalist horizontal-multilateral IGOs (if several of them are in place), 
second, the linkages between general and sectoral horizontal-multilateral bodies and third, their 
linkages to the federal government.
35 Table 5 sums up the respective features of the core IGOs in 
Canada, Switzerland and the U.S. assessed according to the criteria presented in sections III.
36 
 
Taking a closer look at the generalist IGOs, what we find immediately is that Canadian 
intergovernmental bodies are less institutionalized than American or Swiss ones. The establishment of 
the Council of the Federation (FoC) in 2003 as the successor of the Annual Premiers’ Conference 
(APC) has been a crucial step in re-organizing inter-provincial relations. The frequency of meetings 
has been increased compared to the former APC to a minimum of 2 per year. The Council rests on a 
codified founding agreement and has the mandate to exchange information and to develop shared 
positions. It has its own secretariat and is internally differentiated.
37 Despite the growing 
institutionalization of this horizontal arrangement, one crucial criterion is not fulfilled to speak of a 
highly institutionalized IGO: the decision-making rule is still unanimity. Each government insists in 
its veto to delimit autonomy losses ex ante since no decision against the will of a single government 
can be made.  
                                                 
34 In the U.S. there exists a multitude of organizations on lower levels which need to be taken into account in a more detailed 
analysis. However, due to the limitations of the paper they are left out. 
35 Note that the analysis focuses on the organizational make-up of IGOs. If IGOs are weak federal-state and inter-state 
interaction might be nevertheless intense. However, given a weak organizational embedding, it is argued that the patterns of 
IGR are likely to be ad hoc and less stable. 
36 What could not be sufficiently analyzed for the current paper is the nature and specificity of intergovernmental agreements. 
However, since the classification of the single IGOs was quite obvious, this did not create any further problems.  
37 For instance a steering committee of deputy ministers prepares the council meetings and ad hoc committees of the ministers 
responsible for IGR can be called on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, the Premiers’ Council of Health Awareness is under the 
responsibility of the Council of the Federation as well as the Secretariat for Information and Co-operation on Fiscal 
Imbalance, Council of the Federation Founding Agreement, December 5, 2003. 
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 Institutionalization  Vertical 
Integration  
Generalist Inter-
Horizontal 
Integration  
Generalist-Sectoral 
Horizontal Integration 
Canada  Council of the Federation 
(CoF) (multilateral-
horizontal): Medium 
 
First Ministers Conference 
(FMC) (multilateral-vertical): 
Low 
CoF-centre: Weak 
 
CoF-FMC: Weak 
 
FMC-centre: 
Weak
38 
 
Coexistence of 
CoF-FMC for 
horizontal 
representation: 
Low 
CoF-sectoral 
organizations: 
depending on policy 
field weak-high 
 
 
U.S.  National Goverors’ 
Association (NGA) 
(multilateral-horizontal): 
High 
 
National Conference of 
State Legislatures (NCSL) 
(multilateral-horizontal): 
High 
 
Council of State 
Governments (CSG) 
(multilateral-horizontal): 
High 
NGA-centre: 
Medium 
 
 
 
NCSL-centre: 
Medium  
 
 
 
CSG-centre: 
Medium 
 
 
Coexistence of 
NGA-NCSL-CSG 
for horizontal 
generalist 
representation: 
Low  
NGA/NCSL/CSG – 
sectoral organizations: 
depending on policy 
field weak to high 
Switzerland  Conference of Cantonal 
Executives (KdK): High 
KdK-centre:  
High 
Only KdK: High  KdK-Sectoral 
Conferences of 
Cantonal Directors:  
High 
 
While the CoF is institutionalized on a medium level, the First Ministers’ Conferences as the vertical-
horizontal linkage is only weak. The FMC has long been the pinnacle of the intergovernmental 
system. It resolves conflicts on the highest level and gives direction to a network of lower level 
meetings. However, all these linkages are informal and cannot generate reliable patterns of interaction. 
Frequently, it has been suggested that FMCs be held annually and sometimes to be given even 
constitutional status, suggestions which have not been realised (Cameron/Simeon 2002: 62).  
Meetings are organized by the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat which 
has been established by the First Ministers in 1973. In fact, this secretariat has own personal and own 
resources contributed by the constitutive governments. However, it is responsible for organizing First 
Ministers’ Meetings, the Eastern Canadian Premiers’ and the New England Governors’ Conference, 
etc.. Due to this multitude of services, the secretariat does not function as the ‘arm’ of one particular 
group with a particular interest profile. ‘Organizational boundedness’ is only present in formal terms 
since substantially, there is no ‘organizationally bounded’ configuration of actors the secretariat stands 
for. 
All in all it is typical for Canadian federalism that actors avoid being obliged to enter into 
intergovernmental exchanges. This is particularly true for the federal government. Especially the 
convening of an FMC is the prerogative of the Prime Minister, hence FMCs are called only when it is 
                                                 
38 Since the FMC as multilateral-vertical IGO is weakly institutionalized the linkage between horizontal and federal level is 
weak. 
  17advantageous from the centre’s point of view. Typically, federal officials claim that these conferences 
are used by the provinces to attack federal policies, usually for electoral purposes, rather than to 
confront seriously the challenges facing the Canadian society (McRoberts 1985: 95). This strategy of 
blame-shifting has a clearly negative impact on the effectiveness of cross-boundary exchanges. 
Accordingly, despite its almost 100 years of age, the FMC has therefore remained an ad hoc event 
(Meekinson/Telford/Lazar 2003: 16). From a comparative point of view, IGR in Canada has no 
constitutional or legislative basis and little backup by bureaucrats (Cameron/Simeon 2002: 64; Forget 
2001: 133). The respective arrangements are much too weak to change actors’ preferences and to 
generate patterns of intergovernmental interaction which are more than a mere reflection of given 
intra-provincial, inter-provincial and federal constraints. Therefore bilateralism and ad hoc 
coordination  of low inclusiveness remain the dominant forms of interaction (McRoberts 1993; 
Cameron/Simeon 2002). 
As pointed out the success of inter-provincialism measured on the basis of the 
institutionalization of IGOs is fairly limited. Correspondingly, commitments are as good as the good 
will of the participating governments (Lazar/McLean 2000: 168). In particular the scope of IGR is 
heavily dependent on whether the first ministers, in particular the prime minister, find it advantageous 
or not (Cameron/Simeon 2002: 64; Lazar/McLean 2000: 166; Smiley/Watts 1985) which means that 
shifting alliances are the rule. Under such circumstances, agreements necessarily represent smallest 
common denominator solutions between the respective partners (McRoberts 1993: 157).   
Since the FMC as the multilateral-vertical IGO in the system is only called irregularly by 
the federal government, the degree of vertical integration is also very limited. The creation of the CoF 
as exclusively horizontal body evidently cannot compensate for this. This is because the CoF needs the 
centre to achieve its more far-fetching goals such as annual First Ministers’ Meetings or the 
establishment of federal-provincial-territorial protocols of conduct. And the central government 
should have a very limited interest to set up more formalized vertical linkages since it rather profits 
from bilateral interaction on an ad hoc basis in which it usually plays the role of the stronger part. In 
particular when dealing with financially weak provinces it can minimize concessions without the 
involvement of stronger provinces which tend to raise the concessions the centre has to make to reach 
provincial agreement. Having this in mind, it is a plausible interpretation that a medium 
institutionalization of the CoF could only be achieved because the centre was excluded from this 
process. In particular Québéc, as the province which pushed for its foundation, has a strong interest to 
strengthen the horizontal level in order to counterbalance the federal government and to maintain 
provincial autonomy. Especially due to this objective, the autonomy loss arising from the stronger 
organizational back-up of the Council could be reconciled with the intra-provincial competitive 
pressure favouring autonomy protection.  
With regard to horizontal integration, there is no formal clarification about the respective 
tasks of the two multilateral IGOs – the FMC and the FoC - which both are located on the horizontal 
level. They co-exist but – beyond the provinces’ overlapping membership in both – there is no 
  18indication of regularized interaction patterns. The linkages between the generalist multilateral IGOs 
and the sectoral councils vary as greatly as the organizational make-up of the single sectoral 
arrangements do. In some policy areas formalized linkages to the generalist IGOs are in place, for 
instance in the case of the Premiers’ Council of Canadian Health Awareness which is under the 
responsibility of the CoF.
39  
With reference to sectoral interaction itself, there is a wide range of committees of 
ministers and officials that are now held more regularly and partially carry out mandates assigned by 
the first ministers. The regularity of their meetings vary across policy fields from several meetings per 
year to one every three years (Cameron/Simeon 2002: 62; Meekison/Telford/Lazar 2003: 22; 
Simmons 2002). However, note that - despite the partially considerable frequency of interaction - the 
informal character of the councils weakens the bodies’ capacity to achieve relations that extend the 
exchange of opinions (Meekison/Telford/Lazar 2003: 21-2). Hence, also in less visible structures 
which are more protected from political dynamics co-decision could not be achieved. In this context, 
an interesting development since the late 1980s is the general trend of the decentralization of 
intergovernmental management to line departments (Johns/O’Reilly/Inwood 2004: 8; 11). Instead of 
strengthening ‘externalized’ IGOs organizationally, there is a trend that policy-specific exchanges are 
concentrated and intensified intra-governmentally. This strengthening of intra-ministerial bodies 
corresponds with the logic of this composite polity since it maintains the constitutive boundaries 
within the system to a much higher degree. Therefore internal units conflict much less with the logic 
of competition generated within provincial boundaries than ‘externalized’ IGO.  
 
In sum, the competitive pressure within the Canadian sub-states affects the intergovernmental arena in 
a negative way. Actors try to maintain maximal flexibility to be able to react to internal demands and 
prioritize autonomy protection over stable IGR. Since the Canadian horizontal configuration is not 
very complex, ad hoc coordination is feasible because not overly costly and the formation and re-
formation of momentary alliances as well as the exit from alliances quite common. Both the internal 
dynamics and processes in the single sub-states and the horizontal configuration which results from 
the former have contributed to the weak institutionalization and integration of Canadian IGR. 
 
In the U.S. the sub-state dynamics are much more in favor of the institutionalization of IGOs than in 
Canada: First, the competitive pressure is not very high because the constitutional power-sharing 
structures within the states prevent the dynamics of a zero-sum-game. The incentives for blame-
shifting are consequently limited and sub-state actors do not have much autonomy to loose when they 
engage in intergovernmental exchanges. Moreover, due to the high complexity of the configuration, 
IGOs are valuable to save transaction costs. The major difference between the U.S. and the Swiss 
situation is the dominance of constitutional power-sharing structures over partisan linkages in the 
                                                 
39 Council of the Federation Founding Agreement, December 5, 2003. 
 
  19American context. Especially the executive-legislative divides in the states establish a barrier against 
strong system integration as will be shown in the next paragraph. Moreover, while the interest 
configurations are complex in both countries, they show more continuity and a lower conflict potential 
in Switzerland. In sum, on the process level, co-decision and with it cross-boundary harmonization is 
more difficult to achieve in the American context.  
 
On the organizational level, the most crucial feature of American IGR is the co-existence of IGOs 
which represent the interests of the state executives and the state legislatures separately: core 
associations are the National Governors’ Association (NGA), the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) and the Council of State Governments (CSG). Obviously, they directly reflect 
the constitutional power-sharing mechanisms within the states. Yet inter-organizational division does 
not only show in the co-existence of IGOs with a similar scope but also in organizational splits of 
IGOs which represent the same branches: As a counterweight to the NCSL which was perceived as 
too liberal, the more conservative American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) was founded. On 
top of this, ‘lower level’ associations are numerous and some of them - such as the United States 
Conference of Mayors - are very powerful (Cigler 1995; Haider 1974). In short, constitutional 
fragmentation and partisan divides structure the landscape of IGOs while jurisdictional fragmentation 
seems to be the stronger force. The multitude of IGOs clearly devalues the state level’s status as a 
major organizational layer in the system because it renders the formation of one coherent interest 
profile of a single state and, more so, of the horizontal level virtually impossible.  
Ironically, under these circumstances, the high institutionalization of IGOs rather stabilizes 
inter-organizational divisions than it contributes to system integration. The three major state 
organizations, the NGA, the CSG and the NCSL are externally and internally differentiated, meet 
regularly and are run by an executive supported by a permanent secretariat. Internal decisions are 
taken by majority rule. In terms of functions, the NGA and the NCSL are lobbying groups while the 
CSG is a service association functioning as an umbrella organization (Arnold/Plant 1994: 102). To 
improve intra-horizontal linkages, the three IGOs have moved to the same building in D.C. and have 
tried to increase mutual cooperation. However, since they represent only a sub-group of IGOs which 
are located on the horizontal level, the effect on the overall degree of integration is necessarily limited. 
Moreover, the pressure to cooperate in order to gain more weight in the system conflicts with the 
IGOs’ organizational autonomy which led to their philosophy of “cooperate not merge” (Arnold/Plant 
1994: 105).   
   As private interest groups do, American IGOs try to make sure that their members’ views 
are channelled into the process of shaping federal policy. Most crucially, the patterns of American 
IGR evolve around the vertical dimension. Therefore they pursue regular contacts with federal 
officials and their internal differentiation is strongly structured along policy lines. The NGA, for 
instance, runs several standing committees on core policy areas and issues policy positions on federal 
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differ considerably along policy lines.  
All in all, the central government plays the role of the dominant part in federal-state 
interactions, while the states remain reactive (Cigler 1995: 131; Kincaid 1990; Zimmerman 1990: 58-
9). Any decline to participate in nationally prescribed regulatory regimes or grant-in-aid programs is 
virtually non-existent, even though non-participation is technically available.
40 Moreover, usually 
states do not try to take refuge by referring to the unconstitutional status of mandates which hurt the 
prerogatives of the states. Instead, they try to maximise their receiving of national funds and consider 
the national government as financial supplier (Derthick 2001: 51; 54). The fact that states have been 
much less critical of national funding priorities than local actors (Cigler 1995: 144) adds to this 
picture. This naturally affects the functional orientation of IGOs.  
Pro-federal Supreme Court rulings alone cannot be considered as the major determinant 
for the states’ reluctance to insist in their own spheres of authority when confronted with 
Congressional intrusion.
41 It is argued in the literature is that sub-state actors accepted the ‘realism of 
the administrative state’ and therefore cared less about competence distribution than about the 
‘realities’ of funding, implementation and coalition-building around concrete programs (Arnold/Plant 
1994: 106). However, one crucial reality which feeds this acceptance is the unequal capacity of the 
two governmental levels to coordinate internally. For the states to act as one ‘order of government’ 
against the central government and to successfully defend own authorities, successful inter-state 
coordination is a precondition. If the latter is not feasible, state resistance is of limited use. As a 
consequence of this intra-horizontal coordination dilemma, from the state executives over the 
legislatures to single cities lobby separately in Washington for their genuine interests. This draws an 
impressive picture of how the internal constitutional power-sharing structures have been projected 
outside state boundaries and heightens the pressure on state and local actors to compete for national 
funding (Kenyon/Kincaid 1991: 91; 111). This intra-horizontal competition again feeds back to and 
undermines new efforts of horizontal integration right from the beginning. Moreover, this disunity 
among the states serves Congress to legitimise own action since it can point to the failure of the states 
to do the job on their own (Derthick 2001: 38-39) which again reinforces central intrusion.  
 
In a nutshell, the co-existence of considerably institutionalized but loosely linked IGOs are fed by 
two parallel sources. On the one hand, the constitutional executive-legislative divide motivates 
the foundation of IGOs representing executive and legislative state interests separately. The 
                                                 
40 The observed weakness refers only to the decision-making phase, not to policy-implementation, where the states might 
possess considerable leeway how and if to realise central standards. 
41 Albeit the Supreme Court had supported centralisation for several decades, rulings after the mid-80s preserved state 
prerogatives in 50% of the times (Elazar 1990: 15). Later in the 1990s, the Supreme Court adopted a much more protective 
position towards state sovereignty (Conlan 2000: 140). And most importantly, only a small part of legal disputes reach the 
Court in the first place and state courts have – with reference to state constitutions – shown the willingness to extend the 
protection of states beyond the Supreme Court’s interpretation (Hickok 1990: 84). Facing this picture, it is not convincing that 
the states hardly refrain from suing just because they anticipate a final defeat in front of the Supreme Court albeit it certainly 
has been one major centralising force. In contrast, they seem to involve the judiciary only when unable to extract sufficient 
concessions in exchange for central intervention. 
  21internal dynamics and the overall interest configuration make IGOs valuable instruments to save 
transaction costs and to facilitate the aggregation of interests. Nevertheless, ad hoc coordination 
is the best to achieve. This is because the linkages between the horizontal IGOs and the centre 
remain fragmented because the dynamics just described motivate the associations to compete for 
influence on federal policy-making on their own. This situation also prevents that despite their 
strong organizational make-ups the IGOs provide the basis for co-decision processes and cross-
jurisdictional policy-harmonization. Each of them can represent the ‘state interest’ only partially 
most visible in the split between NGA and NCSL. On a more general level, the case study also 
shows that centralization may not be equated with integration, since weak intra-horizontal 
linkages rather supported centralization in the U.S.. Interestingly, in Swiss federalism it is the 
other way around. Integration is considerable while the polity remains nevertheless comparatively 
decentralized.  
 
In Switzerland both the institutionalization of the core IGOs and their mutual linkages are strong. The 
core horizontal-multilateral IGOs in Swiss federalism are first, the generalist Conference of Cantonal 
Executives (KdK) and second, the Conferences of Cantonal Directors responsible for the exchanges in 
particular policy fields (DKs). Most crucially, in contrast to the U.S. Swiss IGR are dominated by 
executives despite the presidential-like structure of the cantons. This first reduces the number of IGOs 
which are located on the horizontal level and second facilitates the formation and the representation of 
one position per canton. 
Since the sectoral DKs have existed much longer than the KdK it is useful to take a first 
look at these bodies although sectoral IGOs are no major focus of this paper. Moreover, Swiss sectoral 
bodies vary much less in their organizational make-up than Canadian and American sectoral bodies 
do. Hence, they define the system of IGR to much wider extent. They are highly institutionalized
42 
and as a crucial vertical linkage, a delegate of the respective federal ministry takes either part in the 
executive or the plenary sessions of each DK.
43 Meetings can result in guidelines, benchmarks or 
inter-cantonal contracts, so-called Concordats. The Concordat is the most formal instrument and in the 
1980s 311 of these treaties existed. Since they aim at solving concrete policy problems, their 
specificity is rather high. Although cantonal non-compliance cannot be effectively sanctioned most of 
these provisions become cantonal law (Armingeon 2000: 115).
44 In sum, the structural embedding and 
the results of inter-cantonal interaction indicate that co-decision prevails in sectoral interaction. 
 
                                                 
42 They usually have a permanent secretariat that represents the respective conference in committees and working groups on 
the inter-cantonal and national level during the year. Besides the plenum which embraces representatives from all cantons 
responsible for the respective policy field, each conference has an executive which runs the respective bodies. Partially they 
are further subdivided in commissions consisting of policy experts out of the cantonal administrations dealing with more 
specific policy problems. 
43 Note that the federal representatives do not have formal voting rights. 
44 With regard to inter-cantonal treaties, the procedures highly differ from canton to canton of how involved the legislature 
and/or the cantonal peoples are when it comes to ratifications. As an illustration, fifteen of the cantons either allow for a 
facultative referendum or apply the normal legislative procedure. Executive and administrative agreements can also be struck 
without demanding ratification by the legislatures in the first place (Freiburghaus/Zehnder 2003: 6-7). 
  22Despite the organizational strength of the DKs, the cantons considered the general representation of 
cantonal interests in the federation as insufficient. In 1993, this critical attitude found its expression in 
the foundation of the Conference of Cantonal Executives (KdK). Its most initial function was to assure 
the consideration of cantonal interests in the Europeanization process. In the last 12 years, however, it 
has become the core IGO channelling general inter-cantonal and inter-organizational transactions.
45 Its 
organizational structure is very similar to the DKs. It is also highly institutionalized, hence is 
externally and internally differentiated. The KdK plenum meets four times a year. In these sessions 
political decisions are made which mostly boils down to ‘common positions’ on certain issues or plans 
of the central government that concerns the cantons’ authority. Decisions are taken by majority rule. 
The plenary session is accompanied by four meetings of a smaller executive committee.
46 It makes 
strategic decisions and prepares the plenary sessions. Most importantly, the decision-making rule and 
the composition of the executive both show that the participating cantons do neither insist in equal 
representation nor in equal veto positions.  
Regarding inter-organizational integration, at the beginning, the central institutions and the 
other intergovernmental arrangements in the system considered the newly found conference as 
potential competitor (Minger 2004: 10). However, nowadays the KdK as well as the DKs evaluate the 
relationship to the other federal peak institutions as productive. Looking at formal indicators for inter-
organizational integration, in December 2001 the KdK and the DKs agreed upon a general framework 
which clarifies the respective responsibilities and attempts to facilitate cooperation between the IGOs 
and the federal government.
47 Among else, the KdK was assigned the task of conflict resolution in 
case that different DKs disagree on which of the sectoral conferences is responsible for a particular 
issue (Jahresbericht CH Stiftung 2001: 9-11).
48 The newest endeavour to strengthen the integration 
between the KdK and the DK is to merge the two organizationally in one ‘House of Cantons’.
49  
Instead of being solely a platform to form a front against the federal government, the KdK 
provides an intra-horizontal generalist channel for exchange as well as for conflict resolution. 
Moreover, it has made active effort to integrate the Bundesrat in its meetings which should strengthen 
the vertical linkage. Over the years, the federal executive has been regularly invited to the plenary 
sessions, invitations which have been accepted on several occasions in the last two years. More 
crucially, KdK-federal contacts take place on a regular basis through the ‘federalism-dialogue’ 
                                                 
45 For instance, the KdK has established a number of committees and working groups on issues of particular cantonal interest 
like on redistributive policy (Jahresbericht CH Stiftung 2000: 21). 
46 It is composed of nine members selected through a regional distributive scheme. 
47 Zusammenarbeit der Kantone mit dem Bund: Rahmenordnung über die Arbeitsweise der KdK und der 
Direktorenkonferenzen bezüglich der Kooperation mit dem Bund, Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen, Fassung vom 3. 
Oktober 2003. 
48 The establishment of a tripartite conference of central government, cantons and towns (TAK) dealing with urbanisation 
policy is an initiative of the KdK which bridges all three levels in the Swiss system. Besides, in 1991 the KdK met with the 
Ständerat in order to discuss about the possibilities to include representatives of the KdK and the ministerial conferences in the 
second chamber’s committee work. 
49 Up to now there has been set up a shared secretary in Bern. However, the organizations are still clearly separate and there 
are voices in the DKs which fear that a real organizational fusion of the two could undermine the DKs’ role in channelling 
policy-specific exchanges. 
  23(‘Föderalismus-Dialog’), a committee composed of Bundesrat delegates and a delegation of 4-5 KdK 
delegates which deals with specific policy areas and issues common papers.   
 
Obviously, the internal dynamics generated by the power-sharing executives in the cantons are very 
favourable towards the institutionalization and integration of IGR which has been confirmed by the 
given analysis of Swiss horizontal-multilateral IGOs. The connection between intra-cantonal 
processes and external relations has already found attention in research on Swiss federalism. 
According to Armingeon, cooperative behaviour is stabilized by the surrounding fora of decision-
making. He argues that conflictual strategies in the federalist arena are in sharp contrast to the style of 
decision-making in the remaining arenas which are corporatism on the one hand and 
consociationalism on the other (Armingeon 2000: 124). Some of the mechanisms on the micro-level 
which allow Swiss regional elites to adapt to demands for cross-boundary cooperation rather easily are 
the following: cantonal political elites are widely protected from electoral punishment since oversized 
coalitions are the most frequent cabinet type. Under these circumstances, the incentives for blame-
shifting strategies are weak. Moreover, the interest configuration is very complex with 26 cantons and 
over 3 decision-makers per cantons on average. This makes ad hoc coordination is costly. Thus to 
invest in the establishment and maintenance of IGOs is a rational strategy to lower transaction-costs. 
And finally, in contrast to U.S., Swiss parties manage to bridge the executive-legislative divides 
within the cantons which reduces the fragmenting effect of internal compulsory power-sharing.  
 
Conclusion and Further Outlook 
In the given paper it has been argued that it is fruitful to consider the internal structures and 
dynamics of federal sub-states to account for the institutionalization of intergovernmental 
arrangements and their mutual integration. To strengthen the given results, three further steps are 
necessary which could not be made within the limited scope of the paper: First, thorough 
comparative process-tracing would be desirable to arrive at a more detailed empirical specification 
of the causal mechanisms which drive the actors’ choices. Second, the role of the judiciary needs to 
be taken into consideration to a much wider extent. And third, the structural analysis needs to be 
extended to IGOs of different scope
50 to arrive at a fuller picture of the patterns of sub-state and 
federal-state interaction.  
What the paper already provided is the following: The theoretical approach tried to 
supplement a perspective on federal dynamics à la Lehmbruch (1978) which refers to structural 
logics and tensions through a micro-foundation. This micro-foundation attempts to specify some of 
the motives of sub-state actors to invest or not to invest in strong intergovernmental arrangements. 
On this basis, a set of testable hypotheses and a corresponding set of indicators could be presented. 
They help to account for and to compare the variety of embeddings and the dynamics that shape 
these embeddings’ organizational features in a systematic way. Furthermore, the paper tried to show 
                                                 
50 Examples are regionally-restricted IGOs which exist in most federal systems.  
  24empirically how the internal lives of constitutive government units affect the patterns of IGR in the 
three federal systems Canada, U.S. and Switzerland. All in all, the preliminary evidence supports 
the theoretically developed argument that in order to assess the dynamics of composite polities, the 
connection between internal sub-state dynamics and their external relations provides an insightful 
starting-point for further research. 
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